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d court or mistake 
intent in because the instructions trial 
preciuded consideration of ignorance or mistake of law defense, she 
was entitled a new 1011-16.) The 
erroneous ruling on (Respondent's pp. 10-18.) Goggin first 
ues this Court may a to district actual 
because such was not presented. (Appellant's reply brief, p. 4.) This 
is frivolous because it is well established that an appellate court may 
the actual holdings of a lower court. Goggin next argues that specific 
intent to violate the law is an element of conspiracy, and therefore she should 
get a new trial to assert this defense. (Appellant's reply brief, pp. 5-9.) Review 
of law and applicable authority establishes that intent to do the criminal act is 
sufficient intent to support a conspiracy, and intent to violate the law is not 
required. Because the district court erred as a matter of law, it abused its 
discretion by granting Goggin a new trial and must be reversed. 
8. Goggin's Argument That The Cross-Appellant May Not Challenge The 
Holding Of The Trial Court On An Issue Raised By A Motion Is Frivolous 
Issues are preserved for appellate review when they are either raised to or 
decided by the trial court. State v. Duvalt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 
1 
(1998). The issue on cross-appeal . "Should the district court's 
a new because intent violate 
of conspiracy in Idaho?" (Respondent's brief, p. 4.) 
law is not an 
state argues 
that district court erred by granting a new trial "after concluding that specific 
intent to violate the law is required for a conspiracy conviction." (Respondent's 
brief, p. 10.) Review of the record shows that this issue was both raised to and 
decided by the trial court, and is therefore preserved for appellate review. 
In her brief in support of her motion Goggin claimed giving Instruction 27, 
which stated that mistake or ignorance of the law was not a defense, was error. 
(R., pp. 938-44.) Specifically, she argued that "the State should have been 
required to prove that Ms. Goggin and her alleged co-conspirators entered into 
an agreement with malevolent purposes." , p. 941.) She asserted there was 
"no evidence" she knew the substance she agreed to manufacture or deliver 
"was illegal in Idaho" and that if she "[did] not know or believe that the objective 
of the agreement [was] illegal" then the agreement "[was] not a conspiracy." (R., 
pp 942-43.) She asserted that her belief that the substance "was legal" 
"negate[d] the specific intent required" for a conspiracy conviction. (R., pp. 943-
44.) 
The state responded to Goggin's claim that instructing the jury that 
mistake of law was not a defense by pointing out that there was no evidence that 
she did not know the substance was a synthetic cannabinoid meant for human 
ingestion, and the claim she "believed what [she was] doing was legal" was 
"exactly what [made the jury instruction] an appropriate and necessary instruction 
2 
is case," .) n 
a new 
that mistake was a 
conspiracy counts. (R., pp. 1011-16.) The 
conclusion specifically on legal determination that 
instructed a good faith the object was is a 
to conspiracy." (R., p, 1015,) 
Even a cursory review of the record shows that question 
ignorance or mistake of law negates intent necessary for conspiracy was 
raised to and court. It was entire issue 
Goggin's assertion that Instruction 27 was erroneous, and was therefore raised 
in Goggin's motion. The state clearly opposed Goggin's motion and asserted 
that instructing the jury that mistake of law was not a defense was proper. 
Finally, the district court clearly granted a new trial on the basis that a mistake of 
law negates the intent necessary to sustain a conviction for conspiracy. 
Goggin's argument that whether the district court erred by granting a new trial is 
not preserved for appellate review is specious. 
C. Ignorance Or Mistake Of Law Is Not A Defense To Conspiracy Under 
Idaho Law 
A person is guilty of conspiracy in Idaho if he "combine[s] or conspire[s] to 
commit any crime or offense prescribed by the laws of the state of Idaho." I.C. § 
3 
1 : IC § u 
an objective, 
one or more in furtherance of the illegal purpose and (3) the 
intent necessary to commit underlying substantive offense." 
=~-=-, 146 Idaho 331, 337, 193 P.3d 878, 884 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. 
Munhall, 118 Idaho 602, 606, 798 P.2d 61, 65 (Ct. App. 1990)). Missing from 
language of the statute and these elements in the cases is any requirement 
that the defendant operated under knowledge that object of the conspiracy 
was illegal. Inferring such a requirement is contrary to the plain language of the 
statute as well as controlling and persuasive authority. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-
18.) 
Goggin first contends that the use of the phrase "crime or offense" instead 
of "act" as the object of the conspiracy "shows that the statute requires the 
defendant to understand that the act that is being agreed upon is actually a 
crime." (Appellant's reply brief, p. 6.) This argument is meritless. The object of 
the conspiracy in this case, manufacturing or delivering of synthetic marijuana, is 
a crime regardless of Goggin's professed mistake of law. See State v. Fox, 125 
Idaho 924, 866 P.2d 181 (1993). Because Goggin was not prevented by her 
professed ignorance of the law from committing the crime she agreed be 
committed, her ignorance of the law did not prevent her from conspiring to 
commit the crime. The plain language of the statute does not include any 
element of knowledge of the illegality of the object of the conspiracy: an 
4 
is a 
n 
only 
to comm 
102 Idaho 378, 384, P.2d 665, 671 (1981). State v. 
~==-:-=-=...:..:' 155 221,307 P.3d 1247 (Ct. 2013); =~~=:.:..:, 1 
Idaho 684, 690, 1 P.3d 657, 663 (Ct. App. 2008); 146 Idaho 
331,337, 193 P. 878,884 (Ct. App. 2008); 1 1 
199,90 P.3d 1 1281 (Ct. App. 2004); =-=--''-'--'-'-:.=:...:.:=, 118 Idaho ,606, 
P.2d 
is "that the 
798 P.2d 61, 65 (Ct. 1990); State v. Martin, 1 3 Idaho 461, 
1082, 1087 (Ct 1 ; ICJI 1101 (intent element 
crime would be committed" (bracketed language omitted).) 
Out of this controlling authority, Goggin addresses only one case, State v. 
Rolon, asserting it "does not reach our specific question." (Appellant's reply 
brief, pp. 6-7.) Repeated statements in cases spanning decades cannot be so 
easily dismissed. The law in Idaho is clear: a person who agrees with others to 
commit a crime need only have "the requisite intent to commit the underlying 
substantive offense" to be guilty of conspiracy. Because the object of the 
conspiracy in this case, manufacturing or delivery of synthetic marijuana, does 
not require knowledge of the illegality of the act, knowledge of the illegality of the 
object is not a defense to the conspiracy. 
5 
U S, 671 (1975), as 
of 
brief, 1 case interpreted a worded 
conspiracy statute to require the prosecution prove "the degree of crimina! 
intent necessary for substantive offense itself" and rejected argument 
"that the Government must show a degree of criminal intent in the conspiracy 
greater than is necessary to convict for the sUbstantive offense," at 
686-87. 
Goggin attempts to distinguish this case by claiming that "[o]f course" the 
defendant in Feola knew assault was illegal, therefore his knowledge that the 
objects of his assault were federal officers was "only a jurisdictional 
requirement." (Appellant's reply brief, pp. 7-8) This argument is devoid of any 
legal authority and falls far short of even addressing the Supreme Court's 
analysis. "A natural reading" of a statute prohibiting a conspiracy to "commit any 
offense against the United States" is "that since one can violate a criminal statute 
simply by engaging in the forbidden conduct, a conspiracy to commit that offense 
is nothing more than an agreement to engage in the prohibited conduct" Feola, 
420 U ,So at 687, Goggin has chosen not to address the relevant part of the 
Supreme Court's analysis. 
Finally, Goggin asserts the state has "failed to prove that the district court 
abused its discretion" because this is a "question of first impression" and 
therefore not reversible even if this Court interprets the statute differently than 
the district court, (Appellant's reply brief, pp. 8-9.) First, this is not a question of 
6 
1 
discretion 
a gross m 
,253 P.3d 746 (2011) 
cases 
when 
eXisting law. 
of discretion be in 
review the ruling on a new motion the trial court does not correctly 
the Goggin's claim that state fails to show an abuse of 
if it shows that the legal standards by the district court were 
result thereby achieved erroneous, has no basis in law. 
is 
even 
, and 
Goggin did not assert a viable defense to conspiracy when she professed 
ignorance of the illegality of the synthetic marijuana she agreed to manufacture 
or deliver. The district court erred by concluding that the jury instructions 
erroneously deprived her of this non-defense. Therefore, the district court's 
order granting her a new trial to assert her ignorance or mistake of law defense 
is reversible error. 
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